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Abstract
Whistleblowing by health professionals is an infrequent and extraordinary event and need not occur if internal voices 
are heard. Mannion and Davies’ editorial on “Cultures of Silence and Cultures of Voice: The Role of Whistleblowing 
in Healthcare Organisations” asks the question whether whistleblowing ameliorates or exacerbates the ‘deaf effect’ 
prevalent in healthcare organisations. This commentary argues that the focus should remain on internal processes 
and hearer courage. 
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Mannion and Davies’1 editorial on “Cultures of Silence and Cultures of Voice: The Role of Whistleblowing in Healthcare Organisations” asks the question 
whether whistleblowing ameliorates or exacerbates the ‘deaf 
effect’ prevalent in healthcare organisations. 
The deaf effect phenomenon has been described as what 
occurs when a person who can perhaps effect action (decision-
maker) does not hear or ignores reports of  bad news, 
resulting in inaction.2,3 Understanding the critical features 
of what is a ‘deaf effect’ is important when considering the 
impact that inaction can take in a healthcare environment 
when health practitioners raise concerns that they perceive as 
essential for patient safety. It is clear from many well-known 
whistleblowing cases (some that have resulted in large public 
Commissions of Inquiry both in the United Kingdom – Public 
Inquiry into Children’s Heart Surgery at the Bristol Royal 
Infirmary 1984-1995, The Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation 
Trust Inquiry and Australia Queensland Public Hospitals 
Commission of Inquiry and the Special Commission of Inquiry 
into Campbelltown and Camden Hospitals in New South 
Wales) that inaction by management internally to address 
the concerns does set the health practitioner on a path to 
becoming a whistleblower.4 The deaf effect and its impact on 
potential whistleblowers (those who choose to report outside) 
is not only evident in health services. Researchers who have 
examined this complex phenomenon have repeatedly found 
that internal inaction and a lower level of trust in, and support 
from, management can be a significant motivating factor to 
report to an external body who may be able to affect action.5-7
Prior to examining the vexed question of the impact of the 
deaf effect on whistleblowing it is prudent to first examine the 
definition of whistleblowing. Whistleblowing is a contested 
notion with a variety of definitions used depending on 
disciplinary focus.8 Social science researchers for instance 
focus on the whistleblowers’ choice of recipient (both 
internally and externally) and readily use the well-recognised 
general definition posed by Miceli and Near9 ‘the disclosure 
by organization members (former or current) of illegal, 
immoral, or illegitimate practices under the control of their 
employers, to persons or organizations that may be able to 
effect action.’9 Within this definition, the whistleblowing 
act includes internal reporting as well as external disclosure 
outside the organisation. This appears to be the stance taken 
by Mannion and Davies1 who see whistleblowing as a part 
of a ‘wide spectrum of formal and informal behaviours that 
are embedded in local organisational context and cultures, 
and enmeshed in both formal and informal governance 
arrangements and practices.’
Research by healthcare professionals and specifically nurses 
has shown that whistleblowing is considered to have occurred 
only when referring to external disclosures. Additionally 
prior to reporting externally, the would-be whistleblower 
should have exhausted all the internal reporting mechanisms 
in order to effect action to bring to an end to the offending 
practice.10-13 The clear distinction in health service literature 
that whistleblowing only includes external disclosures 
arises from the need to value internal reporting of error 
and misconduct as a ‘normal’ organisational process 
(clinical governance), which does not involve a breach of 
confidentiality commonly associated with reporting to an 
unauthorised external authority.10,11,14-17 This is supported 
by the World Health Organisation (WHO) Draft Guidelines 
for Adverse Event Reporting and Learning Systems18 which 
identifies that the primary function of internal reporting is to 
‘enhance patient safety by learning from failures’ and for the 
identification of gaps and weaknesses within the system. 
Whistleblowing to an external source is an infrequent and 
extraordinary event, however despite the pro-social intent 
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of the whistleblower, they are often viewed as disloyal 
or disaffected members of staff who expose damaging 
information, thus betraying the organisation.19-22 The 
whistleblower wants to reveal the truth, while the organisation 
will seeks to conceal it.23 In the process, many whistleblowers 
have become victimised, where the message they are trying to 
deliver is overlooked and the ability to effect action for public 
good or to protect public safety risks being lost. Personal and 
professional retaliation against whistleblowers has been well-
recognised and involves damaging processes that attempt to 
deal with the disclosure by discrediting the whistleblower 
rather than dealing with the information disclosed.24-31
Mannion and Davies1 like others have posed the argument 
that whistleblowing need not occur if those responsible 
in an organisations respond positively to concerns raised 
and begin a process of learning from mistakes as well as 
implementing effective policies to prevent future harm. 
However, to achieve this there needs to be a recognition 
that a culture of silence will remain in health services if the 
following dual processes continue to occur when staff raise 
concerns internally. First is inaction to address the concern 
and second is when the investigation and later action (often 
retribution) are focussed towards the messenger rather than 
those identified in the message. Research into the reasons 
why healthcare professionals, in this case nurses, are reluctant 
to report malpractice have been linked to both apathy, tied 
to an assumption that no action will be taken, and fear of 
retribution to their professional standing or personal lives, 
which have included both negative physical and emotional 
affects.27,30,32-34 
In a recent UK National Health Service (NHS) survey of 
more than 2000 managers and clinicians a disparity of 
opinion emerged on the ‘culture of voice.’ Here, staff were 
invited to report on the quality of leadership, transparency, 
and whistleblowing. When asked about raising concern ‘94% 
of executive directors thought staff could raise concerns’ 
compared to ‘only 57% of nurses’ and when asked if ‘such 
concerns would be handled appropriately’ 90% of executive 
directors thought so, whereas ‘only 26% of nurses agreed.’35 
Further evidence that healthcare staff lack faith in actions 
being taken from concerns raised emerged in the 2014 National 
survey of NHS staff. In this survey of over 624 000 staff, 93% 
indicated that knew how to report concerns, however, only 
57% expressed the view that they were confident that their 
concerns would be addressed.36 
The solution therefore is to ensure that the focus should be 
on the culture within an organisation to ameliorate the need 
for disaffected staff to take the courageous step of reporting 
outside to effect action and bring to a close the offending 
practice or practices. When health service managers are 
faced with reports of failure and particularly issues that 
raise concerns about patient safety, they will demonstrate a 
human response. What seems to be unknown at this time are 
the human factors involved in the behaviours of healthcare 
managers who distance themselves from staff who raise 
concerns about patient safety.
In an examination of management and executive action in 
the United Kingdom’s NHS, Dixon-Woods et al37 found that 
while considerable time and resources had been invested into 
data collection and monitoring systems, the degree to which 
this was ‘translated into actionable knowledge, and then into 
effective organisational responses’ relied on the particular 
human responses of managers and or executive. Dixon-
Woods et al38 large mixed method research program involved 
7 substudies which included data from 107 interviews with 
senior level stakeholders involved in quality and safety, 197 
interviews with executive, board members and frontline 
clinicians, 715 surveys, 2 focus groups, and 10 interviews with 
patients and the public, patient and staff satisfaction survey 
data from 2005-2011 and 621 clinical teams assessed using 
Aston Team Performance Inventory. 
Dixon-Woods et al38 classified senior management’s 
responses into two categories of behaviour: ‘problem-sensing’ 
or ‘comfort-seeking.’ Problem-sensing was thought to occur 
when senior managers actively sought out weaknesses in their 
organisations, using not only the formal incident reporting 
systems, but also ‘softer intelligence.’ Softer intelligence was 
suggested to be any activity that demonstrated active listening 
to staff and patients as well as making ‘unannounced visits 
to clinical areas,’ and having consumers engage in the review 
of services. Comfort seeking was suggested to have occurred 
when management sought data from only limited sources, 
these managers were pre-occupied with compliance, external 
expectations and positive news, they actively sought sources 
of data that provided ‘reassurance that all was well.’ In order to 
avoid negative feedback there was a demonstrated tendency 
to distance themselves from frontline staff, in addition 
concerns raised or critical comments were perceived as 
merely as ‘whining or disruptive behaviour.’37 What is clear is 
that the ‘deaf affect’ to internal reporting is certainly prevalent 
in healthcare and as speculated by Mannion and Davies1 the 
‘more unpalatable the message’ the less likelihood of action. 
It is further speculated that this will be particularly prevalent 
with those who use what Dixon-Woods et al describes a using 
comfort seeking behaviours or those who have what Mannion 
and Davies describe as a vested interest in ‘narratives of 
success.’ 
Mannion and Davies1 are correct in their call for a strategy 
to deal with the resistance to bad news by those in a position 
of power. However, this should be considered as part of 
an overall strategy to improve patient safety and clinical 
governance and not framed as whistleblowing strategy. 
Critical to ensuring that the deaf effect does not exacerbate 
the incidence whistleblowing is a clear understanding of the 
factors that influence managers. Understanding why some 
managers display not only the courage to hear what is being 
said and take appropriate action, but also the courage to 
refrain from inappropriate action such as targeting the bearer 
of the news. Vandekerckhove et al39 suggest future research 
should examine the variables that determine courage on the 
part of the recipient of the bad news, specifically on ‘hearer 
courage’ to understand why some managers ‘have the courage 
to hear,’ under what circumstances and with regard to what 
type of reported wrongs.
It is now time to specifically examine the human 
factors involved in the behaviours of healthcare managers, 
particularly those who distance themselves from staff who 
raise concerns about patient safety. There is an urgent need 
to uncover the variables that determine hearer courage 
for managers. Organisations who have managers who 
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display courage to actively hear the messages of failure and 
adequately address them in a culture of transparency, trust 
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